Why Do Revenue Bills Originate in the House of Representatives

Power of the Handbag

Historical Highlight

"All Bills for raising Acquirement shall originate in the House of Representatives; just the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 7, clause 1

"No Coin shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Upshot of Appropriations made by Police force; and a regular Argument and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Coin shall exist published from time to fourth dimension."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section ix, clause 7

/tiles/non-collection/i/i_origins_power_purse_approps_lc.xml Image courtesy of the Library of Congress The House Appropriations Committee in 1918 featuring (from left to right) time to come Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of S Carolina, former Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Chairman J. Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, future Speaker Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, future Secretary of War James W. Good of Iowa, and future Speaker Joseph Byrns of Tennessee.

Congress—and in particular, the Firm of Representatives—is invested with the "power of the pocketbook," the power to revenue enhancement and spend public money for the national government. Massachusetts' Elbridge Gerry said at the Federal Constitutional Convention that the House "was more than immediately the representatives of the people, and information technology was a proverb that the people ought to hold the purse-strings."

Origins

English history heavily influenced the Constitutional framers. The British House of Eatables has the exclusive right to create taxes and spend that revenue, which is considered the ultimate bank check on royal authority. Indeed, the American colonists' weep of "No taxation without representation!" referred to the injustice of London imposing taxes on them without the benefit of a voice in Parliament.

Ramble Framing

Debate at the Ramble Convention centered on two issues. The offset was to ensure that the executive would not spend money without congressional authorization. The 2d concerned the roles the House and Senate would play in setting fiscal policy.

At the Convention, the framers considered the extent to which the Senate—like the House of Lords—should be express in its consideration of budget bills. The provision was office of a compromise between the large and pocket-size states. Smaller states, which would be over-represented in the Senate, would concede the power to originate coin bills to the Business firm, where states with larger populations would take greater control. Speaking in favor of the provision, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania said, "It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge. This terminate would . . . be best attained, if money affairs were to be bars to the immediate representatives of the people." The provision in the commission'south report to the Convention was adopted, five to three, with iii states divided on the question. The Convention reconsidered the matter over the course of two months, but the provision was finally adopted, nine to ii, in September 1787.

The ramble provision making Congress the ultimate authority on government spending passed with far less debate. The framers were unanimous that Congress, as the representatives of the people, should be in control of public funds—not the President or executive branch agencies. This strongly-held belief was rooted in the framers' experiences with England, where the male monarch had wide latitude over spending one time the money had been raised.

The Early Appropriations Process

The Start Congress (1789–1791) passed the first appropriations act—a mere thirteen lines long—a few months after information technology convened. The police force funded the government, including important pensions for Revolutionary State of war veterans, with just $639,000—an amount in the tens of millions in existent terms. This simple process was brusque-lived. Over time, nine regular appropriation bills emerged and funded such priorities every bit pensions, harbors, the post role, and the armed forces. These were considered on an annual ground by the late 1850s. The House Commission on Means and Ways, which likewise had jurisdiction over tax policy, controlled the appropriations process. But legislation and funding were e'er kept separate. Priorities were spelled out in one law and money appropriated for those priorities in some other. This has remained the practice, as substantive committees pattern authorization acts and the House and Senate Appropriation Committees fund authorized programs later. Indeed, there are laws and parliamentary rules against making new police force in appropriation bills, although such rules are periodically waived.

Subsequent Reforms

In 1865, after the Ceremonious War had created a nearly $3 billion national debt and spending exceeded a billion dollars a year, Congress reformed its funding procedure to handle the government's new demands. The House separated the Means and Means Committee'southward taxing and spending functions. The Appropriations Commission was established to fund programs, while Ways and Ways retained jurisdiction on tax policy. Firm leadership and other committees besides tried to influence the appropriations process, and the lack of coordination over the years led to high deficits and the implementation of the federal income taxation in 1913. Congress passed the Budget and Bookkeeping Act in 1921 to address some of the coordination problems it faced funding regime programs. This police force centralized many of the budgeting functions with the President, who still has considerable agenda-setting power with the federal budget and submits a draft budget to Congress at the beginning of every yr. The appropriations process has been reformed multiple times since 1921, including notable restructurings with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987.

For Further Reading

Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1937).

Garfield, James. "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," Due north American Review, 270: 572–586.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

Kimmel, Lewis. Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789–1958. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959).

Leloup, Lance. The Fiscal Congress. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).

Schick, Allen. Congress and Coin: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980).

—. The Federal Upkeep: Politics, Policy, Process. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Establishment, 2000).

Selko, Daniel. The Federal Financial System. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1940).

Stewart, Charles H., III. Budget Reform Politics: The Pattern of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865–1921. (New York: Cambridge Academy Press, 1989).

Wildavsky, Aaron B. Budgeting and Governing. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006).

—. The New Politics of the Monetary Process. 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).

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Source: https://history.house.gov/institution/origins-development/power-of-the-purse/

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